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Abstract 
This paper focuses on decision making under risk, comparing group and individual risk 
preferences in a lottery-choice experiment inspired by Holt and Laury (2002). The experiment 
presents subjects with a menu of unordered lottery choices which allows us to measure risk 
aversion. In the individual treatment, subjects make lottery choices individually; in the group 
treatment, each subject was placed in an anonymous group of three, where unanimous lottery 
choice decisions were made via voting. Finally, in a third treatment, called the choice treatment, 
subjects could choose whether to be on their own or in a group. Our main findings are that groups 
are more likely than individuals to choose safe lotteries for decisions with low winning 
percentages. Moreover, groups converge toward less risky decisions because subjects who were 
relatively less risk averse were more likely to change their vote in order to conform to the group 
average decision; more risk-averse individuals were less likely to change their preferences. 
Finally our results reveal a positive relationship between preference for risk and willingness to 
decide alone.  
 
JEL Codes : C91, C92, D81, D70, M10 
Keywords : Experiment, Decision rule, Individual Decision, Group Decision 
 
Résumé 
Ce papier s’intéresse à la prise de décision dans le risque, en comparant les préférences vis-à-vis 
du risque de groupes et d’individus à travers une expérience de choix de loteries inspirée de Holt 
et Laury (2002). L’expérience met les sujets face une série de choix non-ordonnés entre loteries 
permettant de mesurer leur aversion au risque. Dans le traitement individu, les sujets font leurs 
choix de loterie seuls ; dans le traitement groupe, chaque sujet est intégré dans un groupe de trois 
personnes anonymes, où les choix de loterie sont pris à l’unanimité à travers un processus de vote. 
Enfin, dans un troisième traitement, appelé traitement choix, les sujets peuvent choisir entre 
prendre leur décision seul ou en groupe. Nous principales observations sont que les groupes sont 
plus prompts que les individus à choisir des loteries sûres lorsque les décisions portent sur de 
faibles pourcentages de gain. De plus, les groupes convergent vers des décisions peu risquées car 
les individus que sont relativement peu averses au risque modifient plus probablement leur vote 
en faveur de la décision moyenne du groupe ; les individus plus averses au risque changent moins 
probablement leurs préférences. Enfin, nos résultats soulignent une relation positive entre le goût 
du risque et la disposition à décider seul. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many real life situations, important decisions are made by (small) groups rather than by a 
single individual (such as production units, boards of directors, committees). This then raises the 
question of how the preferences of different group members are combined to produce the group 
decision. In spite of the fact that many important decisions are made collectively, economics has 
devoted little empirical attention to group decision-making.  In this paper, we contribute to this 
literature by comparing group and individual decision-making. More precisely, we focus on 
decision-making under risk and compare group and individual risk preferences in a lottery-choice 
experiment inspired by Holt and Laury (2002). In this seminal paper, Holt and Laury used the 
results of a simple lottery choice experiment to determine the degree of risk aversion. Subjects 
were successively confronted with the following treatments: a real lottery with low payments 
(less than four Euros in both outcomes), a hypothetical lottery with high payments (the low 
payment outcomes multiplied by 20, 50 or 90), a real lottery with the same high payments, 
followed by the same real lottery with low payments as at the start of the sequence. Holt and 
Laury’s most important results are that subjects exhibit risk aversion even for low payments and 
that risk aversion increases sharply as the scale of payoff increases (for real payoffs only). 
In our experiment, the risk preferences of groups and individuals are compared by implementing 
three treatments over six independent sessions. In the individual treatment (IND), subjects were 
asked to choose between playing two lotteries, one “safe” and one “risky”, with varying 
probabilities of obtaining the higher monetary payoff. In the group treatment (GP), each 
individual was placed in an anonymous group of three and voted over which lottery was chosen. 
If no unanimous decision was reached in the vote, players were informed of other group 
members’ choices in the current vote, and then voted again. The voting rounds continued until 
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agreement was reached or until five rounds were completed. If five rounds were completed 
without agreement, then the lottery option was randomly chosen by the computer.  Finally, in a 
third treatment, called the choice treatment (CHOICE), subjects were asked to state a maximum 
willingness to pay for making their decisions alone instead of choosing in the group of three 
people (and thus express their preference over the first two treatments).  
The main findings of our study are, consistent with previous work, that groups exhibit more risk 
aversion than individuals for high-risk lotteries. In addition, our results indicate a further 
explanation for group decision-making, by showing that relative risk-loving subjects (those who 
are less risk-averse than the other two group members) are more willing to change their vote to 
conform to the group average risk decision than were relatively risk-averse players. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant previous 
research comparing groups and individuals. Our experimental design is presented in more detail 
in section 3, and Section 4 presents and interprets the results of the experiment. Finally section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
A number of empirical results based on natural data concerning team versus individual decisions 
can be found in the existing literature (financial decisions in Prather and Middleton, 2002; 
productivity in Hamilton et al., 2003; and betting in Adams and Ferreira, 2005), but the majority 
of results have come from experimental economics. A recent growing experimental literature has 
explored differences between individuals and teams (or between teams of different size) with 
respect to many different kinds of decisions: beauty-contest games (Kocher and Sutter, 2005; 
Kocher et al., 2006; Sutter, 2005); centipede games (Bornstein et al., 2004); ultimatum games 
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(Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998); dictator games (Cason and Mui, 1997); signaling games (Cooper 
and Kagel, 2005); policy decisions (Blinder and Morgan, 2005); location and pricing (Barreda et 
al., 2002); and auctions (Cox and Hayne, 2006; Sutter et al., 2005). Experimental results on the 
type of choice which interests us here, risky decisions, can be found in Bone (1998), Bone et al. 
(1999), Shupp and Williams (2003), Bone et al. (2004), Baker et al. (2004), Bateman and Munro 
(2005), Rockenbach et al. (forthcoming), and Harrison et al. (2005). The main issues considered 
in this literature are whether teams make better decisions, and whether they are more rational 
than individuals. No consensus has been reached regarding either question, with results 
depending on the kind of game under consideration. This conclusion is similar to that reached in 
social psychology regarding differences in group and individual decisions. In their meta-analysis 
of replies to Choice Dilemma Questionnaires, Kerr et al. (1996) underline that group discussion 
can “attenuate, amplify, or reproduce the judgments biases of individuals depending on the group 
decision making process”. 
With respect to the results, Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) find no significant differences between 
individual and group rejection rates as responders in an Ultimatum Bargaining game, but do show 
that groups offer lower amounts when they are proposers. In the Dictator game, Cason and Mui 
(1997) find that teams demonstrate a greater degree of altruism than do the individuals who make 
up the group, i.e. team choices are dominated by the preferences of the members who are more 
other-regarding. In Bornstein et al. (2004), groups terminate the Centipede Game at an earlier 
stage than do individuals, and group behavior is more rational than individual behavior. Using the 
Beauty Context experiment, teams outperform individuals in both Kocher and Sutter (2005) and 
Kocher et al. (2006). Sutter (2005) finds that four-member teams outperform two-member teams 
and single individuals, although there is no difference between the latter two. The results in Cox 
and Hayne (2006) are not clear-cut between teams and individuals, but in Sutter et al. (2005) 
 6
teams stayed on average longer in an auction than individuals and paid significantly higher prices. 
Blinder and Morgan (2005) find that groups are no slower than individuals in reaching decisions, 
but that the decisions are better. In Cooper and Kagel (2005), teams consistently played more 
strategically than individuals, and their superiority increased with the difficulty of the games. 
Last, Barreda et al. (2002) find that teams exhibited behaviors predicted from an assumption of 
strong risk-aversion, in experiments on individual versus group decisions over risk preferences. 
Rockenbach et al. (forthcoming) carried out an experiment where individuals and groups (not 
consisting of the same subjects) make lottery choices and evaluations. The common effects 
observed in the literature regarding expected utility theory (the common ratio and preference 
reversal effects) are found for both individuals and groups (as in Bone et al., 1999). However, 
teams accumulated significantly more expected value than did individuals, and at significantly 
lower total risk. In an experiment comparing the risk preferences of two real spouses, both 
separately and together, Bateman and Munro (2005) replicated the result of equal rationality in 
group and individual decisions mentioned above, but found that joint choices are more risk averse 
than those made by individuals. Shupp and Williams (2003) evaluate risk aversion via certainty 
equivalent ratios (certainty equivalent/expected value) elicited using a maximum willingness to 
pay mechanism for lotteries. They find that groups exhibit lower risk aversion than individuals 
for lotteries with high winning probabilities, but are increasingly risk-averse as winning 
probabilities fall. Comparing the decisions of the same subjects both alone and in groups, Shupp 
and Williams (2003) underline that group discussion led to greater risk-aversion for lotteries with 
low winning probabilities. Using Holt and Laury’s (2002) method (with payoffs raised by a factor 
of 10), Baker et al. (2004) observe the same phenomena as Shupp and Williams (2003). Last, in a 
paper on preferences over social risk, Harrison et al. (2005) also appeal to the same method (with 
payoffs raised by a factor of 25) and conclude that there are no differences in risk aversion 
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between individuals and groups (consisting of the same subjects). The general conclusion of this 
literature on risky decisions is that groups tend to be more cautious than individuals. 
Many of the above experiments consider the individual and group treatments independently, i.e. 
the same individual participates in only one of the two treatments. As such, we cannot examine 
the behavior of the same individual in two different decision environments. However, if the same 
subject participates in both treatments, a new problem arises: the order of the treatments. Both 
Shupp and Williams (2003) and Harrison et al. (2005) include the same subjects in two 
treatments but do not control for order effects. Baker et al. (2004) use an individual-group-
individual sequence of decisions, and find that subjects were more risk-averse (for high-risk 
lotteries) in groups than in the first individual treatment, and that the group treatment 
significantly affected the decision in the second individual treatment: individuals exhibited 
greater risk-aversion than in first individual treatment. Cason and Mui (1997) introduce two 
orders in a dictator game: individual-team and team-individual. Subjects were more other-
regarding in the individual treatment when it followed the team treatment. Last, their results were 
more consistent with social comparison theory than with persuasive argument theory (the latter 
induces discussion between members rather than social influence). 
A second point is that the great majority of group decisions in this experimental literature are 
based on informal discussion (cheap talk), and so that the decision-making process within the 
group cannot be analyzed. It would be very interesting to open the “black-box” to discriminate 
between the many hypotheses regarding how groups make decisions. The data in Rockenbach et 
al. (forthcoming) are consistent with an excess-risk vetoing rule. In a signaling game experiment, 
Cooper and Kagel (2005) introduced discussion between the two (anonymous) team members via 
an instant messaging system which recorded discussions. Their analysis of the dialogue between 
team members leads them to conclude that teams exhibit strong positive cross-game learning, 
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whereas individuals show negative cross-game learning, which is consistent with adaptive 
learning models with a growing number of sophisticated learners. 
Last, before individual or group decisions, Kocher et al. (2006) asked individuals to choose 
between the two decision procedures and to explain their choice. In their experimental beauty-
contest game, about 60% of subjects preferred to act in teams (and teams won significantly more 
often than did individuals). Their analysis of the causes and consequences of self-selection 
showed that both individuals and team members were satisfied with their chosen role, but for 
different reasons. Kocher et al. (2006) appears to be the first contribution considering the taste for 
autonomy in decision-making. 
Compared to the existing literature, we analyze differences in risk aversion between individual 
and group (three-member) treatments, composed of the same subjects. We take the order effect 
between these two treatments into account, and look into the “black-box” of the group to analyze 
the decision process leading to unanimous choices. Last, we propose a new approach to the 
analysis of the taste for autonomy.  
 
3. The experimental design 
 
The experimental procedure is based on that of Holt and Laury (2002). The experiment was 
computerized and the scripts were programmed using the z-tree platform (Fischbacher, 1999). 
We recruited 108 subjects from September 2004 to May 2006. Our overall design consists of 6 
sessions (with 18 subjects each) of a lottery choice experiment with three treatments. Our first 
treatment, called the “individual treatment”, is based on ten sequential choices between two 
lotteries, one “risky” (with payoffs of €77 and €2) and one “safe” (with payoffs of €40 and €32), 
with probabilities ranging from 10% to 100% (see Table 1a). As noted by Holt and Laury, the 
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payoffs for the safe lottery (Option A) are less variable than those fore the risky lottery (Option 
B). In both options the probabilities for the first of the ten sequential decisions are 10% for the 
high payoff and 90% for the low payoff. The difference in the expected payoffs between the two 
lotteries is such that only an extreme risk-seeker would choose Option B. As the probability of 
the high payoff outcome increases B becomes more attractive relative to A, and at some point 
subjects will switch their preference. Towards the end of the decision sequence even the most 
risk averse subjects should switch over to option B. Contrary to Holt and Laury, the ten decisions 
were not presented simultaneously, as in Table 1a, but shown sequentially and randomly, as in 
Table 1b. The individual treatment consists of 10 successive periods, with a different decision 
each period.  This procedure allows us to measure the differences between group and individual 
decision-making for each of the ten individual decisions.  
 
[insert Table 1a and Table 1b : about here] 
 
 
In the “group treatment”, subjects were placed in anonymous groups of three and presented with 
the same ten decisions as in the individual treatment. After each period, the groups were 
randomly reshuffled. Group members voted over lotteries to try to reach a unanimous decision. If 
a unanimous decision was not reached, players continued to a further vote, after being informed 
of the votes of the other group members. Voting continued until unanimous agreement was 
reached, or until five voting rounds were completed. If no agreement was reached after five votes, 
the option was randomly chosen by the computer. 
The choice treatment consists of two stages within each period. In the first stage, each individual 
is endowed with 10 units (with 2 units corresponding to 1 euro) and is asked how much she 
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would be prepared to pay make their lottery choice alone, with the proviso that only the three 
individuals with the highest bids (among the 18 players of the session) will be allowed to play the 
individual treatment, while the others play the group treatment. The price paid by each winner 
corresponded to the third highest bid. In the second stage, subjects were asked to choose between 
options A and B, alone or by group, depending on the outcome of the previous stage. 
In sessions 1-4, subjects initially undertook the individual treatment, followed by the group 
treatment and the Choice Treatment. To account for potential order effects, as noted by Harrison 
et al. (2005), we ran two additional sessions (sessions 5 and 6) with a different sample of subjects 
which began with the group treatment followed by the individual treatment. At the end of the 
experiment, the outcome of each treatment was determined by the random selection of a single 
decision for each treatment. To control for wealth effects, subjects were informed that only one of 
the two treatment payoffs would be chosen for the payment at the end of the experiment. On 
average, a session lasted for about an hour and 20 minutes, including the initial instructions and 
payment of subjects. Each participant earned €40 on average. 
 
4. The experimental results 
 
4.1. Individual and group decisions 
 
In sessions 1-4, the average number of “safe” choices (option A) for the individual treatment is 
6.6; in the group treatment, the average number of safe choices is 6.5.  In both cases, the number 
of safe choices increases when decisions are by groups. The analogous figures for the group 
treatment are 7.11 and 7.03 respectively. Finally, the average number of safe choices is 7.2 in the 
Choice treatment1. A Mann-Whitney test on the total number of “safe” lottery choices over the 
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first ten periods rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between the individual and group 
treatments (z=-1.892; p=0.058). A similar test over periods 11-20 produces similar results (z=-
1.864; p=0.0623). However, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for differences between 
the number of safe choices in the group and choice treatments finds no significant difference (z = 
-1.628). Finally, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions 
between the two individual treatments (z=0.120) as well as between the two group treatments (z 
= 0.363). 
Figure 1a shows the proportion of A choices in sessions 1-4, for each of the ten decisions listed in 
Table 1a; Figure 1b displays the corresponding data for sessions 5-6. The horizontal axis 
represents the decision number, which corresponds to the probability of the higher payoff. The 
dashed line shows predicted behavior under risk neutrality: A is chosen for the first four decisions, 
and subsequently B.  
 
[insert Figure 1a and Figure 1b : about here] 
 
 
In Figures 1a and 1b the percentage choosing the safe option A falls as the probability of the 
higher payoff increases. Further, groups tend to report higher levels of risk aversion for most of 
the decisions, except for lotteries with high probability of the larger payoff where groups are 
actually less likely to choose the safe lottery A. This is consistent with the result of Baker et al. 
(2004). 
We formalize these results via a random effect probit model, using “safe choice” (lottery A) as 
the dependent variable. The right-hand side variables include the probability of winning the 
larger amount (0.1 to 1.0), and dummy variables for group treatment and prior experience. We 
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also included an interaction between the group variable and the winning probability. Finally, the 
estimations include standard demographics variables such as gender and age. The results are 
shown in Table 2.   
 
[insert Table 2. About here] 
 
Columns (1) to (3) reveal that the probability of safe choice falls as the probability of the higher 
payoff increases, and increases when decisions are collective, suggesting the importance of made 
in a group, underlining the importance of context. The “prior experience” variable is not 
significant. Finally the estimated coefficient on the interaction variable shows that groups become 
progressively more risk-averse as the probability of the higher payoff falls. This is consistent with 
both Baker et al. (2005) and Shupp and Williams (2003). However, this result is inconsistent with 
Harrison et al., (2005) who found no group effect. Last, the demographic variables are mostly 
insignificant. 
 
4.2. Voting decisions and the determinants of collective choice 
 
We now focus on voting decisions in the group treatment. The vote procedure consists of five 
rounds of voting. If no unanimous decision was reached during a vote, players went on to the 
next round of voting, after being informed of choices of the other group members in the previous 
vote. The rounds continued until agreement was reached or until five rounds had been completed. 
If five votes were completed without agreement, then an option was randomly chosen by the 
computer. We first consider the evolution of disagreements within groups. Disagreement occurs 
when the group makes decisions unanimously and when some group member deviates from the 
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average decision. A number of configurations are possible. First, the subject who disagrees is 
more risk-loving than the other group members and chooses lottery B while the other two group 
members choose lottery A. Second, the subject is more risk-averse if he chooses lottery A and the 
other two subjects choose lottery B. There are also two intermediate situations: the subject is 
weakly more risk averse if he chooses lottery A (or weakly more risk-loving if he chooses lottery 
B) and one of the two other group members chooses lottery B (lottery A).  We then analyze the 
determinants of collective choice. Figures 2a and 2b display the evolution of disagreements 
within groups in each round of voting and for each of the ten decisions listed in Table 1a, for 
sessions 1-4 and 5-6. 
 
[insert Figure 2a. and figure 2b. About here] 
 
 
As expected, unanimous group decisions were more difficult for the intermediate probabilities 
(decisions 5 to 8). The figures also show that the probability of disagreement decreases with the 
number of voting rounds. For example, the probability of disagreement is 75% in vote 1 of 
decision 7 in sessions 1-4, and decreases to 12% in vote 5. Groups therefore required several 
rounds of voting to reach unanimous decisions. Most unanimous decisions involved the safe 
lottery (A) and the average number of A lotteries chosen increases with the number of votes. For 
example, the probability of choosing lottery A increases from 66% in vote 1 in sessions 1-4 (63% 
in sessions 5-6) to 70% (71%) in vote 5.  This result is of interest because it suggests that 
decision-making under the unanimity rule produces safer choices.  
Why groups are more risk averse? We consider the relationship between the probability of 
changing vote between two rounds of voting and the individuals’ risk attitude relative to the 
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group’s average risk attitude. The groups defined on the horizontal axis are determined as 
described above.  
 
[insert Figure 3. here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that the probability of changing decision between two rounds of voting depends 
on the relative risk attitude compared to the rest of the group. The probability of changing 
decision is greater when the two other group members have voted for the same lottery. Figure 3 
also shows that relative risk lovers are more likely to move towards a less risky choice than are 
the relatively risk-averse to move towards a more risky choice.  
Table 3 provides a formal test of this result, via a random effects probit on the probability of 
changing decision between two votes. The key independent variable is “relative risk lover”, 
which equals one if the subject chose the risky option while at least one of the other group 
members chose the safer lottery. The coefficient on this variable is interpreted in relation with the 
omitted variable “relative risk averse”.  The second specification includes additional variables to 
control for demographics. 
 
[insert Table 3. here] 
 
The results in Table 3 confirm the previous results. The estimated coefficient on “relative risk 
lover” is positive and significant at the 5% level, so that the probability of switching is higher if 
the subject is more risk loving than other group members. Relative risk lovers change their votes 
towards safer options more often than the relatively risk averse change their vote to riskier 
options.  
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4.3. Willingness to Pay and Risk Aversion 
 
We now consider the relationship between willingness to pay and risk aversion. Figure 4 presents 
the frequency of bids in the first stage of the choice treatment. 
 
[insert Figure 4. here] 
 
In 45% of cases subjects chose the minimum bid of 0 units, and less than 1% chose the maximum 
bid of 10 units. The average bid is 1.9 units over all participants, with figures of 5.71 units for 
those who decided individually and 1.14 units for those who decided in groups.  
Table 4 provides a formal analysis of the determinants of WTP, using a Tobit model to control 
for censoring. The right-hand side variables include the individual’s lagged bid, and a variable 
measuring risk aversion (the number of safe choices under the individual treatment). Finally we 
include a variable controlling for previous conflicts within groups, by considering whether the 
lottery was randomly chosen by the computer in the previous period in the case of disagreement.  
 
[insert Table 4. here] 
 
Table 4 shows, unsurprisingly, that past bid predicts current bid. In addition risk aversion is 
negatively and significantly related to current bids. Finally, subjects who experienced a 
disagreement in the previous period are more likely than others to propose a higher bid. Both of 
these results indicate that less risk averse individuals are more willing to escape from the tyranny 
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of group decision-making, especially since they tend to compromise more frequently in the group 
treatment.  
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
The main findings of our study are, consistent with previous research, that groups are more likely 
to choose safe lotteries than are individuals. We then provide new insights on group decision-
making, by showing that relative risk-lovers (subjects who are less risk averse than the other two 
group members) were more likely to change their vote than were relatively risk averse players, 
who were reluctant to change their position.  
They are number of possible explanations of the group decision making. We have presented our 
results in terms of willingness to conform to the group. Alternatively, group decision-making 
may derive from strategic or non strategic motives (altruism, fairness). While it is difficult to 
distinguish cleanly between theories, we note that our experimental design rules out strategic 
reasons since all participants were rematched after each period. Also social preferences cannot 
explain why voting rounds differ from one another in probability of disagreement.  
Another alternative explanation of our experimental results is that background risk of choosing 
randomly an option if no agreement is obtained after vote 5 might interact with individual risk 
aversion2. However, if this were the case, one should observe a higher level of disagreement in 
the last voting round compared to the previous other rounds. On the contrary, our results indicate 
that the probability of disagreement decreases over time with the number of voting rounds, which 
is more consistent with our conjecture of a dynamic conformity to the group. 
Our findings are of interest in the context of previous research. As discussed in the paper, 
previous results on the effect of collective decision-making on risky choice are mixed. Harrison 
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et al., (2005) find no group effect, while Baker et al. (2005) indicate that groups are on average 
more likely than individuals to choose safe lotteries for low winning probabilities. A possible 
explanation for these differences is that the rule by which decisions are reached is different. In 
both our work and that of Baker et al, subjects were asked to make unanimous decisions, 
inducing less risk-averse subjects to converge toward less risky decisions. On the contrary, in 
Harrison et al. (2005), each group voted for the lottery he preferred under a majority voting rule. 
There are grounds to expect that choices will be different under the unanimity rule than under the 
majority rule. Indeed it seems reasonable to assume that the unanimity rule induces more pressure 
toward uniformity in groups than the majority rule. Moreover, the alternatives over which the 
group decides may also be influenced not only by the decision rule but also by the amount of 
information individuals have about one another's preferences. These are likely fruitful areas for 
additional research on group decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Footnote 
1 The average number of safe choices under the choice treatment is 6.9 for individuals who 
decided alone. 
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2 Most of the time background risk is treated as exogenous (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Quiggin, 
2003). Several studies have investigated the importance of background risk. (Harrison et al., 
forthcoming; Lusk and Coble, 2006). Lusk and Cobble (2006), find mixed evidence concerning 
the influence of background risk on risk taking behavior whereas Harrison, List and Towe 
(forthcoming) observe that background risk increases risk aversion. 
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Table 1a. Standard Payoff Matrix 
 Option A Option B 
Decision Prob. p Payoff Prob (1-p) Payoff Prob. p Payoff Prob (1-p) Payoff 
1 10% 40 euros 90% 32 euros 10% 77 euros 90% 2 euros 
2 20% 40 euros 80% 32 euros 20% 77 euros 80% 2 euros 
3 30% 40 euros 70% 32 euros 30% 77 euros 70% 2 euros 
4 40% 40 euros 60% 32 euros 40% 77 euros 60% 2 euros 
5 50% 40 euros 50% 32 euros 50% 77 euros 50% 2 euros 
6 60% 40 euros 40% 32 euros 60% 77 euros 40% 2 euros 
7 70% 40 euros 30% 32 euros 70% 77 euros 30% 2 euros 
8 80% 40 euros 20% 32 euros 80% 77 euros 20% 2 euros 
9 90% 40 euros 10% 32 euros 90% 77 euros 10% 2 euros 
10 100% 40 euros 0% 32 euros 100% 77 euros 0% 2 euros 
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Table 1b. Sequential payoff decision 
Option A Option B 
Prob. p Payoff Prob (1-p) Payoff Prob. p Payoff Prob (1-p) Payoff 
70% 40 euros 30% 32 euros 70% 77 euros 30% 2 euros 
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Table 2. The Probability of Safe Choice: Random Effects Probit 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at   
1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) Sessions 1-4 
(treatments indiv 
and group) 
(2) Sessions 5-6 
(treatments indiv 
and group) 
(3) All sessions (4) All sessions  
P(higher payoff) -0.069*** -0.093*** -0.074*** -0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
Group 0.363*** 0.668*** 0.433*** 5.204*** 
 (0.112) (0.190) (0.095) (0.644) 
Interaction :    -0.065*** 
Group*probability    (0.008) 
Age (years) -0.001 -0.264** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.131) (0.010) (0.012) 
Male -0.235 0.331 -0.158 -0.168 
 (0.166) (0.401) (0.184) (0.205) 
Prior experience   
   
-0.039 
(0.208) 
-0.036 
(0.227) 
Constant 5.056*** 11.326*** 5.359*** 4.530*** 
 (0.345) (2.641) (0.380) (0.421) 
Number of indiv. 72 36 108 108 
Log-Likelihood -361.56 -165.28 -538.65 -496.34 
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Table 3.  Changing Lottery Decision Between Two Votes: Random Effects Probit 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -.6113***    
(.087) 
-1.085*** 
   (.240) 
Relative risk lover .6016** 
  (.2922) 
.6244** 
  (.294) 
Age  .0278 
 (.0114) 
Male  -.1522  
(.1436) 
Years of education
 
 -.3109  
(.2098) 
 
Observations 476 476 
Log likelihood -292.323 -289.022 
       
 Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%;  
 ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Average WTP for Deciding Alone: Tobit Regressions 
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 (1) (2) 
Constant -1.11*** 
(.189) 
-.3136 
  (.543) 
i's lagged bid  1.03*** 
  (.054) 
1.04*** 
   (.053) 
Risk aversion   -.132* 
  ( .079) 
Random vote in 
previous period 
 .894* 
   (.471) 
Nb. Obs 648 648 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1024.14 
370.43 
-1021.14 
373.16 
Left-censored    
observations 
292   292   
Right-censored 
observations 
5 5 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1a. The Proportion of Safe Choices in Each Decision (sessions 1-4) 
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Figure 1b. The Proportion of Safe Choices in Each Decision (sessions 5-6) 
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Figure 2a. Frequency of Disagreements for Each Decision in Treatment 4 (sessions 1-4) 
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Figure 2b. Frequency of Disagreements for Each Decision in Treatment 4 (sessions 5-6) 
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Figure 3. Change of Vote Decision as a Function of Relative Risk Aversion 
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Figure 4. Frequency of Bids 
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